Pop Mart International Group Limited (09992)

Equity Research Report　|　Industry: Designer Toys/IP Operations　|　Report Date: September 13, 2026　|　Price data as of the September 11, 2026 close (HKD); technical-indicator data points are August 31, September 2 and August 25, 2026, respectively, and lag the latest close

This report was automatically compiled by AI based on publicly available information and is for reference only. It does not constitute investment advice.

1. Executive Summary

Pop Mart（09992.HK）closed at HKD 153.00 on September 11, 2026, with a total market capitalization of approximately HKD 203.76 billion. In 2025, the company generated revenue of RMB 37.120 billion, up 184.7% year on year; profit attributable to owners of the Company was RMB 12.776 billion, up 308.8%, while gross margin reached 72.1%. However, revenue growth slowed to 23.8% in the first half of 2026, and growth in net profit attributable to the parent fell to 10.1%. Revenue was RMB 17.173 billion and net profit attributable to the parent was RMB 5.038 billion. Management has also indicated that the full-year target set at the beginning of the year—revenue growth of no less than 20%—will most likely not be achieved. The fundamentals are shifting from ultra-high growth to a phase of slowing growth and margin pressure.

The company’s core competitiveness lies in its IP portfolio, global store network, membership base and self-operated retail capabilities, rather than in self-owned manufacturing capacity. In 2025, artist-IP revenue was RMB 33.406 billion, accounting for approximately 90.0% of total revenue; plush products generated RMB 18.708 billion, or 50.4% of revenue, overtaking figures for the first time to become the largest category. Overseas revenue totaled RMB 16.27 billion, accounting for 43.8%, with particularly strong growth in the Americas and Europe and other regions. However, overseas revenue declined 11.6% year on year in the first half of 2026, while China revenue grew 47.3% and accounted for 71.0% of total revenue, indicating that the growth center temporarily shifted back to China.

IP performance diverged. In the first half of 2026, Twinkle Twinkle generated revenue of RMB 2.65 billion, up 580.6% year on year, becoming the second-largest IP. THE MONSTERS generated RMB 4.454 billion, down 7.5%, while MOLLY generated RMB 901 million, down 33.6%. THE MONSTERS generated RMB 14.161 billion in 2025, approximately 38% of full-year revenue, so fluctuations in core IPs have a significant impact on overall performance. The company plans to launch a share buyback of RMB 2 billion to RMB 5 billion over the next six months, although detailed execution progress and the amount have not yet been fully disclosed.

As of September 11, the share price was near a dense cluster of short- and medium-term moving averages. MA5 to MA50 were approximately HKD 153.6–155.3, while MA200 was approximately HKD 157.6–158.1 and remained above the share price. RSI declined from 50.382 to 44.808, and MACD turned negative, indicating weak short-term momentum. HKD 150.5–153.1 is the first support zone, while HKD 156–159 is the main resistance zone. Recent turnover was approximately HKD 713 million, with a turnover rate of approximately 0.35%, significantly lower than on August 10, indicating cooling short-term trading activity.

2. Company Overview

2.1 Basic Information

2.2 Main Businesses and Product Portfolio

• IP incubation and operations
• Designer toys and retail
• Theme parks and experiences
• Digital entertainment

2.3 Position in the Upstream and Downstream Value Chain and Cost/Profit Structure

Pop Mart describes itself as “China’s leading designer toy and cultural entertainment company,” with an integrated operating platform covering the entire designer-toy IP value chain. Its four business segments are IP incubation and operations, designer toys and retail, theme parks and experiences, and digital entertainment. Product formats include blind boxes, figures, ball-jointed dolls（BJDs）, MEGA, plush toys, derivatives and others. Proprietary products are divided into artist IPs and licensed IPs. Core IPs include THE MONSTERS（the LABUBU family）, MOLLY, SKULLPANDA, CRYBABY, DIMOO, Twinkle Twinkle and HIRONO. FY2025 revenue was RMB 37.120 billion（+184.7% year on year）and adjusted net profit was RMB 13.08 billion（+284.5%）; GAAP net profit was RMB 12.776 billion（+308.76%）. By IP, artist IP revenue was RMB 33.406 billion（90.0%）and licensed IP revenue was RMB 3.382 billion（9.1%）. By category, plush products generated RMB 18.708 billion（50.4%, overtaking figures to become the largest category）, figures RMB 12.023 billion（32.4%）, derivatives and others RMB 4.473 billion（12.0%）, and MEGA RMB 1.916 billion（5.2%）. By region, China generated RMB 20.85 billion（+134.6%）, Asia-Pacific RMB 8.01 billion（+157.6%）, the Americas RMB 6.81 billion（+748.4%）, and Europe and other regions RMB 1.45 billion（+506.3%）. Overseas revenue totaled RMB 16.27 billion, accounting for 43.8%. As of 2025-12-31, the company operated 630 stores in 20 countries globally（net increase of 109 for the year）and 2,637 robot stores（net increase of 165）. Mainland China membership as of 2025-12-31 totaled 72.58 million registered members; members contributed 93.7% of sales and the repurchase rate was 55.7%. Note: Pop Mart is not a resource-based or heavily asset-intensive manufacturer. Its “resources” are its IP portfolio, artist/designer contracts, store network and membership base. It has very limited self-owned production capacity and relies mainly on external contract manufacturers.

• Production model: Primarily OEM/ODM, with no self-owned factories. Contract manufacturers are concentrated in toy-manufacturing regions such as Shipai Town in Dongguan, Heyuan, Shantou, Chenghai and Yiwu. The company is also described as having “six major global production bases”（source: Subaoxw/New Beijing News, citing company financial-report wording; no detailed location list was found, and the information is from a single source and should be cited cautiously）.
• Actual procurement inputs: Injection-molded plastics（PVC/ABS）, vinyl materials, plush fabrics, precision molds（steel molds）, precision injection-molding capacity and manual sewing labor. Mold costs vary significantly: a complete set of steel molds for mainstream PVC/ABS blind boxes costs several hundred thousand to several million yuan; a single vinyl mold for limited-edition large dolls costs RMB 20,000–30,000 and has an optimal life of only several hundred to 3,000 cycles（source: Yongqing Research Notes industry interviews; third-party research）.
• Supplier concentration: Some reports identify Longchuan Danny（Longchuan, Heyuan; an industrial park with 16,000 employees）as the largest supplier, accounting for approximately 35.1% of its procurement, and claim that its fabrics use “German-imported Shu cotton velvet, which only three factories globally can produce”（source: an industry-visit article reproduced by Toutiao/Sohu on 2025-07-17）. The 35.1% figure and the Shu cotton velvet details appear only in a single self-media source and could not be cross-verified against the prospectus or annual report; they should be marked as pending verification.
• Supplier structure and bargaining power: Yang Jingbing, the company’s CFO, explicitly explained at the 2025 annual-results meeting that one reason for the higher gross margin was that “a flexible supply-chain strategy enhanced bargaining power with suppliers” and that “the proportions of licensing fees and mold fees declined.” Starting in 2025, the company concentrated procurement among core suppliers（source: New Beijing News, 2026-03-25）. This is the company’s official position and may be used as evidence of improved upstream bargaining power.
• Counterevidence from contract manufacturers: Jiemian News（2024-04-22）quoted a supplier as saying that “Pop Mart’s orders have lower margins and higher quality requirements,” while payments were relatively timely. A Dongguan factory owner reportedly said that contract-manufacturing margins were only approximately 10%（3%–5% for single-process processing）, with high-quality-rate penalty clauses and exclusivity agreements; approximately 40% of contract manufacturers had exited its supply chain over the past three years. The latter figures come from a single self-media source and should be cited cautiously. Overall assessment: as the value-chain leader, Pop Mart has strong bargaining power over upstream suppliers, compressing margins at the contract-manufacturing stage.
• The claim that Starlight Culture Entertainment is a core contract manufacturer is contradictory. One online post claimed that Starlight Culture Entertainment was a core vinyl/plush contract manufacturer, with related orders accounting for 30% of its revenue in 2024; another source quoted the company’s board secretary as denying that it “had anything to do with Pop Mart.” The two claims conflict, so this memorandum does not accept either as fact and marks the matter as questionable.

3. Financial Data and Valuation Analysis

3.1 Recent Operating Performance

FY2025 audited consolidated results were disclosed on 2026-03-25. Currency: RMB. Revenue was RMB 37.120 billion（+184.7%）, gross profit RMB 26.765 billion（+207.4%）, gross margin 72.1%（+5.3ppt year on year）, operating profit RMB 16.890 billion（+306.6%）, profit before income tax RMB 17.037 billion（+290.2%）, profit for the year RMB 13.012 billion（+293.3%）, net profit attributable to the parent RMB 12.776 billion（+308.8%）, and non-IFRS adjusted net profit RMB 13.084 billion（+284.5%）. Adjusted net margin was approximately 35.2%; basic EPS was RMB 9.61（+307.2%）, diluted EPS was RMB 9.58, and the final dividend was RMB 2.3817 per share（ex-dividend date 2026-05-15; payment date 2026-05-28）. H1 2026 unaudited interim results were disclosed on 2026-08-20. Revenue was RMB 17.173 billion（+23.8%）, gross profit RMB 11.966 billion（+22.59%）, gross margin 69.7%（-0.6ppt year on year）, net profit attributable to the parent RMB 5.038 billion（+10.1%）, non-IFRS adjusted net profit RMB 5.156 billion（+9.5%）, adjusted net margin approximately 30%, basic EPS RMB 3.80（+10.5%）, and no interim dividend was declared. The company reports in RMB, while share price and market capitalization are in HKD, creating foreign-exchange conversion differences. Detailed data by region, category, IP and channel are provided in the body of the research memorandum.

FY2025 was the company’s strongest performance since listing: revenue rose 184.7%, gross margin reached 72.1%—the highest since listing—and adjusted net margin was approximately 35.2%. Plush revenue was RMB 18.708 billion（+560.6%, 50.4% of total）, becoming the largest category for the first time. THE MONSTERS（the LABUBU family）generated RMB 14.161 billion（+365.7%, approximately 38% of annual revenue）, prompting market concern about single-IP concentration risk. Revenue in the Americas rose 748.4% and revenue in Europe and other regions rose 506.3%, making overseas markets the primary incremental growth driver. However, the share price fell approximately 15%–22.5% on the results date（2026-03-25）, depending on the measurement and timing, indicating that high growth had already been priced in and that the market questioned subsequent growth.

H1 2026 growth fell sharply and was materially below consensus expectations. The market had previously expected H1 revenue of approximately RMB 19.98 billion and net profit of approximately RMB 6.64 billion; actual revenue was approximately 14% below expectations and net profit approximately 24% below expectations. China Merchants Securities International said first-half earnings were 15%–20% below market expectations. Overseas revenue totaled RMB 4.972 billion, down 11.6%（Asia-Pacific -9.7%, Americas -16.5%, Europe and other regions +5.9%）. China revenue was RMB 12.201 billion（+47.3%, 71.0% of total）. Gross margin declined 0.6ppt year on year to 69.7%, which the company attributed to a lower proportion of high-margin overseas revenue and higher raw-material prices. By IP, Twinkle Twinkle generated RMB 2.65 billion（+580.6%, becoming the second-largest IP）, while THE MONSTERS generated RMB 4.454 billion（-7.5%）and MOLLY RMB 901 million（-33.6%）. Founder Wang Ning said at the interim-results meeting that the company would “most likely fail to achieve the 20% growth target set at the beginning of the year,” effectively lowering full-year guidance. He also said the company planned a large share buyback of RMB 2 billion–5 billion within six months. Overall, the financial profile is shifting from “above-expectation high growth” to “slower growth plus margin pressure.” FY2025 data are cross-verified by multiple sources, including Gelonghui/Securities Star, The Paper, Economic Information Daily and Caijing, and are considered highly reliable. H1 2026 data are corroborated by Jiemian News, AASTOCKS, Securities Star（Jinwu Finance）and Economic Information Daily, and are also considered highly reliable.

3.2 Earnings Forecasts

The earnings forecasts above are individual broker forecasts（adjusted net profit, in RMB）rather than a unified, same-date multi-institution consensus. The research memorandum explicitly notes that no authoritative, unified-date multi-institution consensus table for revenue/net profit/EPS was identified. Consensus estimates for Hong Kong-listed peers are typically available from Bloomberg/Refinitiv or the “earnings forecasts” sections of AASTOCKS, but no independently verifiable multi-institution aggregate was obtained in this exercise. Accordingly, “consensus” figures should be treated cautiously. Management guidance should also be noted: Wang Ning explicitly said at the interim-results meeting that the beginning-of-year target of “2026 revenue growth of no less than 20%” would most likely not be achieved. Most forecasts do not disclose detailed revenue, growth-rate or EPS estimates; the relevant fields are therefore marked “Not disclosed.”

3.3 Valuation and Institutional Ratings

The current valuation requires attention to differences in methodology and timing. Two subpages of Eastmoney’s Hong Kong-stock F10 provide different figures. Under the FY2025 annual-report methodology（RMB financial metrics corresponding to HKD market capitalization/share price）, one page shows basic EPS of RMB 9.61, net assets per share of RMB 16.5887, operating cash flow per share of RMB 8.0906, ROE of 77.52%, return on total assets of 54.40%, net profit margin of 35.05%, a payout ratio of approximately 25%, TTM dividend yield of approximately 1.68%, total market capitalization of approximately HKD 218.8 billion, PE（TTM）of 15.47x, PB（MRQ）of 8.87x, and 1,331,723,150 shares outstanding. Under the 2026 interim-report methodology, the other page shows basic EPS of RMB 3.80, net assets per share of RMB 17.3152, ROE of 22.23%, return on total assets of 15.96%, net profit margin of 29.70%, TTM dividend yield of approximately 1.79%, total market capitalization of approximately HKD 203.8 billion, PE（TTM）of 13.65x, PB（MRQ）of 7.67x, and 1,331,779,203 shares outstanding. Reference share-price calculations are: HKD 203.8 billion ÷ 1.3318 billion shares ≈ HKD 153; HKD 218.8 billion ÷ 1.3317 billion shares ≈ HKD 164.

Historical valuation ranges cited by brokers include the following: CICC（2026-03-26）said the current share price corresponded to 26/27E adjusted P/E of 13x/11x; a subsequent CICC update said 16x/13x; BOCOM International（2026-05）said 2026E P/E was only 12.1x, at a historical low; another BOCOM report cited approximately 14x 2026E P/E. Citi, SPDB International, Nomura and First Shanghai generally used 20x forward P/E to derive their target prices. This suggests that institutions have broadly lowered their anchor for a “fair valuation midpoint” from 30x to approximately 20x. In conclusion, current valuation is approximately 13.7x–15.5x PE（TTM）and 7.7x–8.9x PB（MRQ）, a significant decline from the more than 90x PE seen in FY2024. Institutional ratings and target prices are extremely dispersed, ranging from HKD 121（China Merchants Securities International, “Sell”）to HKD 380（upper end of the portal aggregation range）, reflecting major disagreement over the sustainability of overseas growth after LABUBU. The ratings span January to August 2026 and cannot be treated as a same-date multi-institution consensus.

Uncertainty warning: financial statements are in RMB, while share price and market capitalization are in HKD, creating conversion differences in cross-currency metrics such as PE and dividend yield. The two PE figures of 13.65x and 15.47x shown on the same Eastmoney page arise from different reporting periods/timing and exchange-rate conventions. Neither the Eastmoney valuation page nor the moomoo aggregation page specifies a precise market-data snapshot time; actual trading-terminal quotations should be used. The core contradiction is that FY2025 was the company’s “strongest performance ever,” while H1 2026 growth plunged, overseas revenue declined, gross margin fell and management actively lowered full-year guidance. The financial profile is shifting from “above-expectation high growth” to “slower growth plus margin pressure,” with the valuation framework moving from approximately 30x forward P/E to approximately 20x. In addition, the “40 analysts, Strong Buy, target-price range HKD 158–380” figure appears only on moomoo, while China Merchants Securities International’s “Sell, HKD 121 target” is mainly seen in a single Guoyuan Futures repost; such figures should be marked as single-source data.

4. Recent News and Announcements

4.1 Southbound Selling

According to a Securities Star report dated September 12, 2026, Southbound funds sold 233,600 shares of Pop Mart（09992.HK）on September 11. The specific value of the sale and the post-sale ownership percentage were not disclosed in the research memorandum.

4.2 Monthly Return on Movements in Securities for August 2026

Pop Mart published its monthly return on movements in securities for the month ended August 31, 2026, on September 1, 2026. According to related reports, the company updated its August 2026 monthly return, with share capital remaining stable. Detailed changes in the share-capital structure were not disclosed in the research memorandum.

4.3 2026 Interim Results Announcement

Pop Mart published its interim results announcement for the six months ended June 30, 2026, together with a supplemental announcement on the grant of awards, on August 20, 2026. Revenue for the first half was RMB 17.173 billion, up 23.8% year on year; net profit was RMB 5.16 billion. Overseas revenue declined 11.6%, and first-half revenue of RMB 17.17 billion was below expectations. The share price fell as much as 8% after the results were released.

4.4 Proposed Share Buyback Plan

Chairman Wang Ning said Pop Mart would launch a RMB 2 billion–5 billion buyback plan within the next six months. The company intends to introduce the RMB 2 billion–5 billion buyback plan and focus on improving business health this year. Detailed execution progress and the actual amount bought back were not fully disclosed in the research memorandum.

4.5 Wu Yue Appointed Non-Executive Director

Pop Mart announced the appointment of Wu Yue as a non-executive director. The effective date of the appointment and details of Wu Yue’s personal background were not disclosed in the research memorandum.

4.6 Wang Ning Visits LVMH Headquarters

Pop Mart Chairman Wang Ning visited LVMH headquarters and presented LVMH Chairman Arnault with a limited-edition commemorative LABUBU. At the time, Pop Mart’s market capitalization was approximately HKD 200 billion and LVMH’s market capitalization approximately EUR 210 billion.

4.7 Previous Share Buybacks

Pop Mart previously completed multiple share buybacks, including spending approximately RMB 600 million to repurchase 3.94 million shares and HKD 251 million to repurchase 1.40 million shares. Detailed repurchase dates and average prices were not fully disclosed in the research memorandum.

4.8 2025 Final Dividend

Pop Mart published and subsequently revised a summary of the final dividend for the year ended December 31, 2025. Revenue surged 185% year on year, and the company will pay a dividend of RMB 2.38 per share. The detailed payment timetable and ex-dividend date were not disclosed in the research memorandum.

4.9 Record 2025 Revenue but Share Price Plunges

Pop Mart’s 2025 revenue reached a record high, but its share price plunged. Detailed revenue data and the share-price decline were not fully disclosed in the research memorandum.

5. Share-Price Performance and Technical Analysis

5.1 Price Overview

5.2 Technical Indicators

Based on the latest verifiable data（September 11, 2026 close of HKD 153.00）, Pop Mart rebounded to HKD 159.9 in late August and moved above the 100-day moving average before falling back in early September. MACD turned negative（8/31 +0.81 → 9/2 -0.43）, RSI declined from neutral（50.4）to relatively weak（44.8）, and short- and medium-term moving averages（MA5–MA50）clustered in the HKD 153.6–158.4 range, leaving direction unclear. MA200（approximately HKD 157.6–158.1）remained above the price and acted as resistance. Technical indicators were taken from August 25, August 31 and September 2, respectively, and lag the latest closing price.

5.3 Short-Term Outlook（Next Week; Scenario Analysis for Reference Only）

⚠️ Risk warning: The following is a subjective scenario analysis based on the September 11, 2026 closing data, historical prices and technical indicators. It does not constitute investment advice or any offer or instruction to buy or sell. Scenario weights are heuristic subjective judgments based on the current technical pattern and fund flows, not statistical probabilities.

① Key Technical Levels

② Scenarios for the Next Week（Subjective Weights, Not Statistical Probabilities）

• Range-bound consolidation（relatively higher weight, approximately 50%（subjective heuristic weighting, not a statistical probability））: The share price trades narrowly within HKD 150–158. Trigger conditions: no major news, daily turnover remains at the current HKD 700 million–1 billion level, and MACD fluctuates around the zero line. MA5–MA50 would remain clustered, with direction undecided.
• Weak decline（medium weight, approximately 30%（subjective heuristic weighting, not a statistical probability））: A decisive break below first support at HKD 150.5, accompanied by renewed net selling by Southbound funds or weakness in the IP-consumption/“guzi economy” sector, would send the price toward HKD 145, with strong support at HKD 137.4–141.8. Trigger condition: a break below 150.5 without meaningful volume-based buying support.
• Stronger rebound（lower weight, approximately 20%（subjective heuristic weighting, not a statistical probability））: A high-volume move above the HKD 156–159 resistance zone—particularly a decisive break above MA200 at approximately HKD 157.6–158.1—would target HKD 162 and levels above the previous intraday high of HKD 159.9. Trigger condition: catalysts such as new products, financial results or institutional buying combined with a significant increase in daily turnover.

③ Fund-Flow and Liquidity Background

The recent turnover rate was approximately 0.35%（9-11）and 0.373%（9-4）, significantly below 1.01% on 8/10, indicating cooling short-term trading activity. Daily turnover has recently been mostly within HKD 700 million–1 billion（approximately HKD 713 million on 9-11, HKD 1.046 billion on 9-2 and HKD 797 million on 8-25; HKD 2.077 billion on 8-10）, while the three-month average daily volume of approximately 13.30 million shares（AASTOCKS）can serve as a volume benchmark.

Regarding ownership structure, founder Wang Ning held approximately 49.14% through a family trust and holding platforms as of July 2026（source: Designer Toy Industry Monthly）. Southbound funds held approximately 24.26% as of 2026-09-03（source: Securities Star; four of the five trading days in early September recorded net selling, and cumulative net selling over the past 20 days was 5.0865 million shares）. H&H International Investment, associated with Duan Yongping, held approximately 5.55% long positions as of 2026-07-30 according to HKEX disclosure. It purchased 9,823,200 shares at an average price of HKD 150 on May 25, with its long position temporarily rising to 7.65% on July 6. Major holders are primarily the founder group, Southbound funds and long-term individual investors. A single discussion-board source claimed that mainstream public and sovereign funds（including BlackRock and Vanguard）had reduced their holdings to 26.5%; this could not be cross-verified and is pending verification.

The above ownership data lag by one to two months or more, and the structure may have changed. In addition, a China Merchants Bank International report dated 2026-09-10 stated that Southbound ownership had fallen to 46.8%, in severe conflict with Securities Star’s 24.26% figure. The methodology cannot be determined, so the figure is treated as a conflicting item and not adopted. The same report said short interest had declined 1.4ppt to 22.3%, with 13.3 days required to cover. Actual free float is relatively small（founder group approximately 49% + Southbound funds approximately 24% + Duan Yongping approximately 5.5%, totaling nearly 79%）. Combined with a daily turnover rate of only approximately 0.35% and daily turnover of approximately HKD 700 million–1 billion, the stock has a relatively locked-up ownership structure but not particularly deep day-to-day trading liquidity. Large transactions may therefore have a relatively noticeable price impact, and slippage risk should be monitored.

Verifiable volume-confirmation signal: using the stock’s normal recent daily turnover of HKD 700 million–1 billion as the baseline, sustained daily turnover above approximately HKD 1.5 billion—roughly double recent normal levels—could be treated as confirmation of fund entry or directional selection. Conversely, if the share price falls below HKD 150.5 while turnover contracts below HKD 700 million, the pattern would be more consistent with a low-volume drift lower.

④ Points to Monitor（Observation Framework Only, Not Trading Instructions）

• Monitor the battle between first support at HKD 150.5 and the HKD 156–159 resistance zone, particularly whether MA200（approximately HKD 157.6–158.1）can be decisively reclaimed（observation framework, not a trading instruction）.
• Monitor volume: whether daily turnover can rise above approximately HKD 1.5 billion as confirmation of direction（observation framework, not a trading instruction）.
• Monitor whether Southbound funds continue net selling（four of the first five trading days in September saw selling）and whether new buying or selling disclosures emerge from Duan Yongping or other long-term funds（observation framework, not a trading instruction）.
• Monitor short interest（22.3% according to China Merchants Bank International）and changes in the short-selling ratio; accelerating short covering could amplify short-term volatility（observation framework, not a trading instruction）.

The above scenarios are based on the September 11, 2026 closing data, technical indicators from August 25–September 2, and historical prices and technical calculations. Short-term share prices will also be affected by news, fund flows, the broader market and other factors. Technical indicators are inherently lagging and limited. This analysis does not guarantee future performance or constitute a trading recommendation. Investors should independently assess the latest market information and bear their own investment risks.

6. Industry Structure and Competitor Analysis

7. Risk Factors

• High concentration in core IP. THE MONSTERS generated RMB 14.161 billion in 2025, approximately 38% of full-year revenue. If the IP continues to cool, product repurchases weaken or related new products underperform, Pop Mart’s overall revenue and profit could be materially affected. THE MONSTERS revenue already declined 7.5% year on year in H1 2026.
• Uncertainty around the succession of new IPs. Although Twinkle Twinkle revenue rose 580.6% year on year to RMB 2.65 billion in H1 2026, MOLLY revenue declined 33.6% over the same period. Whether new IPs can continue scaling and offset declines in mature IPs has not been sufficiently validated.
• Reversal in overseas operations. Overseas revenue totaled RMB 16.27 billion in 2025, or 43.8% of total revenue, but declined 11.6% year on year in H1 2026, including declines of 9.7% in Asia-Pacific and 16.5% in the Americas. If overseas revenue does not resume growth, overall growth and the high-margin mix may remain under pressure.
• Profit growth materially lagging revenue growth. H1 2026 revenue grew 23.8% year on year, while net profit attributable to the parent grew only 10.1%. Gross margin declined 0.6ppt to 69.7%. The company attributed this to a lower proportion of high-margin overseas revenue and higher raw-material prices. If these factors persist, profit sensitivity may remain below revenue sensitivity.
• Full-year growth target proactively lowered by management. Wang Ning said the company would most likely fail to achieve the beginning-of-year target of at least 20% revenue growth for 2026. This indicates that management’s assessment of the near-term operating pace has weakened, and previously high market-growth expectations may face further revisions.
• High dependence on external contract manufacturing. The company primarily uses an OEM/ODM model and has very limited self-owned production capacity. Problems involving core contract manufacturers, production scheduling, yield rates or quality control could affect the supply and delivery of popular products. The claim that a single supplier accounts for approximately 35.1% of procurement has not been cross-verified against the annual report or prospectus, leaving uncertainty regarding supplier concentration.
• Ownership and liquidity structure may amplify share-price volatility. The founder group, Southbound funds and Duan Yongping’s investment entity collectively hold a high proportion, although the relevant ownership data are lagged or inconsistent. As of September 11, the turnover rate was approximately 0.35% and turnover approximately HKD 713 million. Continued Southbound selling or large transactions could have a noticeable price impact.
• Significant divergence in valuation and market expectations. Different data sources show P/E ratios of approximately 13.79x–17.51x, while institutional target prices range from HKD 121 to above HKD 300. Some ratings and target prices are based on single-source reposts or different dates. If subsequent results fall below forecasts, the valuation midpoint may decline further.
• Uncertainty over execution of the share-buyback plan. The company plans to launch a RMB 2 billion–5 billion buyback over the next six months, but the timing, actual scale and repurchase prices have not been fully disclosed. The plan’s support for the share price and per-share metrics cannot be determined in advance.
• Technical pattern remains weak and indicators are lagging. The latest closing price of HKD 153.00 is below MA200 at approximately HKD 157.6–158.1; MACD has turned negative and RSI has declined to 44.808. If the price breaks below HKD 150.5 without a meaningful increase in volume, it may fall toward HKD 145 and test the HKD 137.4–141.8 support zone. The relevant indicators are from August 25–September 2 and lag the latest close.

8. Conclusion and Outlook

Pop Mart still has a relatively clear growth foundation. Most revenue comes from artist IPs, while its self-operated stores, online channels, robot stores and membership system provide strong end-market reach and pricing power. As of the end of 2025, the company operated 630 stores and 2,637 robot stores across 20 countries, while Mainland China registered members totaled 72.58 million and members contributed 93.7% of sales. The continuation of future growth will depend on whether Twinkle Twinkle and other new IPs can take over the growth baton, and whether growth in China and overseas operations can recover, rather than relying primarily on high growth from a single core IP.

Valuation has fallen substantially from the more than 90x P/E level seen in 2024. At the September 11, 2026 share price, P/E ratios from different data sources were approximately 13.79x–17.51x and P/B ratios approximately 7.63x–7.65x. However, financial data are denominated in RMB while share price and market capitalization are in HKD, and valuation timing and methodology differ across platforms; these metrics should therefore be interpreted cautiously. Institutional views vary considerably, with target prices ranging from HKD 121 to above HKD 300, reflecting substantial disagreement over overseas sustainability after LABUBU, future growth and the appropriate valuation midpoint.

Key areas to monitor include whether revenue and profit growth stabilize in H2 2026, whether gross margin can recover toward 2025 levels, whether the decline in THE MONSTERS narrows, whether Twinkle Twinkle and other new IPs can achieve scaled succession, and whether overseas revenue can return to growth. From a share-price perspective, a high-volume break above the HKD 156–159 resistance zone could improve the technical pattern. A break below HKD 150.5 without volume support would warrant attention to HKD 145 and the HKD 137.4–141.8 support zone. The above assessment is based solely on the financial, news and technical data provided and does not constitute a buy or sell recommendation.

Data Sources

• What does Pop Mart (09992) do?
• Pop Mart (09992.HK): Southbound funds sold 233,600 shares on September 11
• NetEase (9999.HK) - Ngor's Pick - South China Securities Company Limited
• CK Hutchison (00001): Company overview, stock price, real-time quotes, charts, news and financial reports
• 09992.HK - Latest indicators
• Jun Sheng SP leads Ningbo Joyson Electronics H-share IPO; CMBI acts as sole financial adviser
• Pop Mart (09992): Share price, market capitalization, real-time quotes, charts and financial reports
• 09992.HK
• NetEase company information
• Pop Mart (09992)
• Pop Mart (09992): Company overview, stock price, real-time quotes, charts, news and financial reports
• Pop Mart’s 2025 revenue reached a record high, but the share price plunged
• Pop Mart (09992): Company profile
• Pop Mart (9992.HK): Emerging concerns over concentration and operating costs
• Pop Mart (09992): Revenue composition
• Pop Mart (09992.HK)
• Pop Mart revenue reached a record high, but the share price fell more than 20%
• Pop Mart 2025 net profit nearly tripled; share price fell sharply after results
• Revenue up 184.7% for the year, share price down 22.5% in one day: Reassessing Pop Mart
• Pop Mart (9992.HK): Emerging concerns over concentration and operating costs
• Pop Mart 2025 net profit nearly tripled; one IP contributed nearly 40% of revenue
• Pop Mart 2025 revenue surpassed RMB 30 billion; overseas revenue exceeded 40%
• Annual report just released, Pop Mart share price plunges
• Pop Mart share price fell more than 20% after results; LABUBU family revenue exceeded RMB 10 billion while new IP cooled
• Pop Mart (9992.HK)
• Pop Mart fell more than 23% intraday; 2025 revenue RMB 37.12 billion
• Revenue up 184.7% for the year, share price down 22.5% in one day
• Pop Mart 2025 annual report
• Starlight Culture Entertainment, Pop Mart’s core supplier
• LABUBU’s wealth secret lies in Dongguan’s 200-ton steel behemoth
• LABUBU’s windfall and Pop Mart’s capacity anxiety
• Why not expand capacity amid LABUBU shortages?
• Understanding the cost breakdown of Pop Mart products
• Why not expand production when LABUBU remains in short supply?
• Overseas expansion accelerates; Pop Mart first-quarter revenue up more than 40%
• Dongguan toy-factory owners’ awakening: From 3% profit to 72% gross margin
• Designer toys decoded: Craft, business and trade-offs
• IP toy-industry chain analysis
• Designer-toy and cultural-creative stores: Two vastly different worlds
• China’s designer-toy market enters the “Warring States period”
• Designer-toy and cultural-creative stores: Two vastly different worlds
• Can TOP TOY become the next Pop Mart?
• 52TOYS, backed by Wanda and pursuing a Hong Kong listing
• What to watch in the designer-toy IPO wave
• The third player does not want to become the second Pop Mart
• Viewpoint
• The “guzi economy” boom: IP at the core
• After Pop Mart, China’s designer-toy market enters the “Warring States period”
• 02699 Xinming China
• HKEX disclaimer
• NetEase: Earnings and revenue performance
• NetEase: Earnings and revenue performance
• Market trends and research reports
• 0992.HK Growth Metrics
• Hong Kong stock announcements and research
• NetEase, Inc.
• NetEase income statement
• Pop Mart 2025 revenue surged 184.7% to RMB 37.1 billion
• Pop Mart 2025 net profit nearly tripled; share price fell sharply
• Pop Mart 2025 net profit nearly tripled; share price fell sharply
• Pop Mart suddenly plunged more than 16% in the afternoon
• Pop Mart’s net profit rose 2.8x to RMB 13 billion; share price fell more than 15%
• Pop Mart revenue hit a record high, but share price fell more than 15%
• Revenue up 184.7%, share price down 22.5%
• Pop Mart revenue hit a record high, but share price fell more than 15%
• Overseas revenue down 11.6%; Pop Mart first-half revenue below expectations
• Pop Mart first-half revenue RMB 17.17 billion; large share buyback planned
• Pop Mart H1 profit attributable to shareholders up 10.14%; revenue up 23.76%
• Pop Mart first-half revenue and net profit both well below expectations
• Overseas revenue down 11.6%; Pop Mart first-half revenue below expectations
• Pop Mart after the LABUBU era
• Pop Mart after the LABUBU era
• Pop Mart H1 net profit up 10.1% year on year
• Market news page
• Pop Mart growth slows sharply; Wang Ning lowers expectations
• SPDB International maintains Buy rating on Pop Mart
• First Shanghai maintains Buy rating on Pop Mart
• BOCOM International maintains Buy rating on Pop Mart
• Mega Bank domestic fund news
• CICC maintains Outperform rating and HKD 248 target
• CICC maintains Outperform rating and HKD 218 target
• BofA Securities maintains Buy rating and HKD 300 target
• China Merchants Securities cuts 2026–28 earnings forecasts by an average of 25%
• BOCOM International cuts Pop Mart target to HKD 232.8
• SPDB International maintains Buy rating
• Pop Mart final-dividend summary
• HKEX disclaimer
• Pop Mart 2025 revenue hit a record high, but share price plunged
• Pop Mart revised final-dividend summary
• Pop Mart repurchased 3.94 million shares for approximately RMB 600 million)/mobile/news.aspx?newsid=NOW.1512910&newssource=AAFN)
• Pop Mart latest results
• Wu Yue appointed non-executive director
• Pop Mart will pay a dividend of RMB 2.38 per share
• Wu Yue appointed non-executive director
• Wu Yue appointed non-executive director
• Monthly return for the month ended August 31, 2026
• Summary of Pop Mart’s August 2026 monthly return
• Hong Kong stock English announcement index
• Pop Mart updated its August 2026 monthly return; share capital remained stable
• Pop Mart monthly return for August 2026
• Wang Ning visits LVMH headquarters and presents limited-edition LABUBU
• Investor relations
• Pop Mart Chairman Wang Ning visits LVMH headquarters
• Pop Mart updated its August 2026 monthly return
• Pop Mart latest results
• Pop Mart latest results
• Overseas revenue down 11.6%; Pop Mart first-half revenue below expectations
• Pop Mart H1 revenue RMB 17.17 billion; emerging IPs surged
• Pop Mart H1 revenue reached RMB 17.173 billion, up 23.8%
• Pop Mart 2026 interim report
• Pop Mart released its 2026 interim report
• Pop Mart released its 2026 interim report
• Pop Mart plans HKD 5 billion buyback
• Pop Mart proposes RMB 2 billion–5 billion buyback
• Pop Mart to launch RMB 2 billion–5 billion buyback within six months
• Wang Ning: Pop Mart plans RMB 2 billion–5 billion buyback
• Profit up 10% but below expectations; even a HKD 5 billion buyback could not save the stock
• Pop Mart International Group Ltd Ordinary Shares (09992)
• Pop Mart company overview
• Pop Mart International Group Limited (9992.HK)
• Pop Mart (9992.HK) price, news and history
• Underlying-asset data and real-time quote
• Pop Mart valuation methods and financial statistics
• Pop Mart company overview
• Pop Mart stock information
• Pop Mart stock information
• Pop Mart advanced chart
• Pop Mart technical analysis
• Pop Mart technical analysis
• POP MART technical analysis
• Stock terms
• POP MART technical analysis
• TradingView technical analysis
• Pop Mart technical analysis chart
• Pop Mart technical analysis
• MACD death cross and support analysis
• Pop Mart trading data
• Pop Mart quick quote
• Pop Mart (09992)
• Pop Mart briefly rose more than 3% above the 100-day moving average
• Market News Feed
• Southbound Stock Connect
• Market News
• Pop Mart stock quote
• Market intelligence
• Designer-toy industry monthly report
• Pop Mart: Southbound funds bought 57,000 shares on September 3
• China Merchants Bank International: Consumer discretionary biweekly flow monitor
• Duan Yongping becomes Pop Mart’s second-largest shareholder
• Discussion details
• Pop Mart: Southbound funds sold 4.8496 million shares on April 8
• Pop Mart fell more than 30% over two days
• Cross-industry copyright dispute: Pop Mart versus T-Bu
• Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect
• BOCI: Active Southbound holdings changes this year

This report was automatically researched, compiled and generated by AI based on publicly available sources. Information is current through the September 11, 2026 close for price data（HKD）; technical-indicator data points are August 31, September 2 and August 25, 2026, respectively, and lag the latest close, so timing differences may exist. Specific data should be verified against the company’s official announcements and authoritative data terminals. This report is for information and research purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Investors should make independent judgments and bear their own investment risks.